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COMMENTS
creditors, particularly those of the husband, against the com-
munity need clarification. Third, a frank recognition that the
wife is able to obligate the community in certain cases would
resolve most of the present difficulties in this area.
Karl W. Cavanaugh
TERMINATION OF THE COMMUNITY'
The community begins with the marriage and ordinarily
regulates the property rights of the husband and wife, as be-
tween themselves, so long as the marriage lasts. Exceptionally,
this matrimonial property regime may terminate while the mar-
riage subsists. Problems arise if the different events and pro-
cedures which terminate the community are not carefully dis-
tinguished, for principles applicable to one event or procedure
are not necessarily applicable to another.
The events and procedures which terminate the marital com-
munity may be classified according to two characteristics.
First, termination of the community may be direct or conse-
quential. Termination is direct if it results from a procedure
designed primarily to terminate the community; otherwise, it
is consequential. Second, termination of the community may
be judicial or natural. If the termination occurs as a result of
court action, it is judicial; otherwise, it is natural. Thus the
causes for termination may be characterized as follows: (1)
separation of property,2 direct and judicial; (2) death,3 conse-
1. Throughout this Comment, "termination" will be used, rather than the
term "dissolution," as "dissolution" may connote the process of liquidating the
community's assets-a topic beyond the scope of this Comment.
2. Although the Louisiana Civil Code does not expressly declare that the
separation of property dissolves the community, yet such is the legitimate con-
clusion to be drawn from the provisions on this subject. See Spencer v. Rist,
16 La. Ann. 318 (1861) ; Holmes v. Barbin, 15 La. Ann. 553 (1860).
3. The community ceases to exist on the death of either partner. See LA.
CIVIL CODE arts. 136, 2406 (1870) ; Vaccaro v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 932(E.D. La. 1944), aff'd, 149 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1945) ; Poutz v. Bistes, 15 La.
Ann. 636 (1860) ; Stewart v. Pickard, 10 Rob. 18 (La. 1845); Hart v. Foley,
10 Rob. 378 (La. 1842) ; Griffin v. Waters, 1 Rob. 149 (La. 1841) ; Broussard
v. Bernard, 7 La. 216 (1834) ; Succession of Evans, 8 Orl. App. 196 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1911).
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quential and natural; (3) absence, 4 judicial in that court action
is needed to have community declared terminated, and direct or
consequential depending on the circumstances; (4) separation
from bed and board,5 consequential and judicial; (5) divorce,"
consequential and judicial; (6) annulment of a putative mar-
riage,7 consequential and judicial; and, (7) inception of bad
faith in a putative marriage,8 consequential and natural. Civil
death and general confiscation of goods,'0 both of which would
be classified as consequential and judicial, are of historical in-
terest as examples of procedures which formerly terminated
the marital community, but form no part of modern civil law."
SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
12
The action for separation of property, now the only action
that is always direct,1 3 originated in the Roman dotal system,'
14
4. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 65 (1870) ; Pedlahore v. Pedlahore, 151 La. 288,
91 So. 738 (1922) ; of. Azar v. Azar, 239 La. 941, 120 So.2d 485 (1960) ; accord,
FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 124. For the almost unanimous opinion of the French
commentators, see 1 SIREY, CODES ANNOTtS 87, n.9 summary (3d ed. 1861).
For the Spanish provisions, see 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY
PROPERTY § 187 (1943).
5. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 123, 136, 155 (1870); Cassagne v. Cassagne,
207 La. 1033, 22 So. 2d 559 (1945) ; Roux v. Jersey Ins. Co., 98 So. 2d 906
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1957).
6. There is no basic difference between separation from bed and board and
divorce with respect to the community. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 123, 136, 155,
159 (1870) ; Crochet v. Dugas, 126 La. 285, 52 So. 495 (1910).
7. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 136, 2406 (1870). Termination of the putative
community is based on the theory that an annulment dissolves the putative
marriage the same as a divorce dissolves the marriage. See 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL
LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW
INSTITUTE) no. 1159 (1959).
8. See Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. Fernandez, 159 So. 339 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1935) (dictum) ; 1 DALLoz ENCYCLOPEDIA, CommunautM n o 1739 (1951).
9. Abolished in France by Law of May 31, 1854 (D.C. 54.4.91).
10. Spanish punishment for high treason was provided for in NOVISIMA
RECOPILACI6N bk. 10, tit. 4, L. 10-11 (1805). Though such laws have been
repealed in Spain and Mexico, the ramifications of the termination are still
felt with respect to the rights of the innocent spouses. See 1 DE FUNIAK, PRIN-
CIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 188 (1943).
11. See notes 9 and 10 supra.
12. Separation of property is a matrimonial property regime in which the
spouses do not enjoy a community of property. The separation of property
spoken of in this Comment is the action for separation of property, which is
only one cause for the regime of separation of property. The other causes are
by prenuptial contract and a judgment of separation from bed and board. See
LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 136, 155, 2392, 2425 (1870).
13. Direct action is used in this Comment to describe an action which is
designed primarily to terminate the community. The only other direct action
is that available to the spouse of an absentee under LA. CIVIL CODE art. 64
(1870).
14. See Daggett, The Wife's Action for a Separation of Property, 5 TuL. L.
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unrelated to community property.17 Dowry was given the hus-
band.to help defray expenses of the marriage; to accomplish
this purpose it was under his control during the marriage. 16
However, the wife or her heirs were entitled to return of the
dowry upon dissolution of the marriage. 17 Later Roman law
allowed the wife to secure return of the dowry even during.the
marriage, if the dowry were in danger of depletion by the hus-
band's mismanagement, his own financial difficulties, or his
failure to reinvest the dowry as required by law.' 8 The French
.Code drew from these Roman provisions, 9 but modified them
so ,that the successful action for separation of property had the
additional effect of terminating the community. 20 In turn, most
of the Louisiana provisions on the action for separation are
literal translations of the French articles and have changed lit-
tle since 1808.21 The Louisiana action has the effect of securing
the return of an existing dowry and paraphernal funds, and it
terminates the community. 22
As the successful action for separation of property alters
the basic property relations between the spouses, and thereby
REv. 55 (1930) ; 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION
BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1161 (1959).
15. Both the French and Spanish systems have their origins in Germanic
customary law. See, e.g., Cole's Widow v. His Executors, 7 Mart.(N.S.) 41, 48
(La. 1828) : "The doctrine of the community of acquets and gains, was unknown
to the Roman law; and although now common, we believe, to the greater number
of European nations, its origin cannot be satisfactorily traced. The best opinion
appears that it took rise with the Germans."
16. See CORBETT, THE ROMAN LAW OF MARRIAGE 177 (1931); Cf. 1 Mo-
REAU & CARLETON, PARTIDAs bk. 3, tit. 2. L. 5 (1820): "The ancient sages
therefore thought proper to give to the husband the administration and use of
the wife's estate, to supply his wants, when he stood in need, on the condition
to furnish his wife with what was necessary." LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2387 (1870).
17. See 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1163 (1959); of. LA. CIVIL CODE
arts. 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374 (1870).
18. See CoRmr, THE ROMAN LAW OF MARRIAGE 198 (1931); 13 Scorr,
THE CIVIL LAw 180 (1932).
19. See 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1161 (1959); 2 TROPLONG, DROIT
CIVIL EXpLIQUit, Du contrat de mariage no 576 (1850).
20. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1451: "La communautM dissoute par la spara-
tion soit corps de et de biens .... The Spanish did the same. See 2 MOREAU &
CARLETON, PARTIDAS bk. 4, tit. XI, L. 26 (1820).
21. See Daggett, The Wife's Action for a Separation of Property, 5 TUL. L.
REV. 55 (1930). The provisions now appearing as LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2426
and 2437 (1870) were added respectively in the 1825 and 1870 revisions.
22. See, e.g., Robertson v. Davis, 9 La. Ann. 268 (1854) ; Davock v. Darcy,
6 Rob. 342 (La. 1844).
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affects third persons, policy has dictated that the action be care-
fully limited and regulated. First, only the wife may bring the
action,2 a limitation originating in the dotal system in which
the wife brought the dowry into the marriage and only she was
concerned with its return during the marriage. The continued
existence of this restriction in our present system seems justi-
fiable, as the husband, who has complete control of the com-
munity, has no need of the protection which the action seeks to
afford. Second, the creditors of the wife cannot bring the suit,
even in her name, without her consent.24 The justification for
this rule lies in the fact that the dowry was intended for the
benefit of the husband and his interest was considered to out-
weigh that of the wife's creditors.25 Third, the Code provides
that the wife can bring the suit only when her dowry is in
danger or has not been reinvested as prescribed by law.26
All these limitations presuppose that the wife has brought
a dowry into the marriage. The Supreme Court, however, has
stated that the grounds for the action given in the Code are
merely illustrative,27 and that the wife may bring the action,
even though she has no dowry, if she needs to prevent her fu-
ture earnings from falling into a mismanaged community.28
Thus, except for the automatic termination of the community,
provided for by the Code, the only direct connection between the
action for separation of property and community property has
been made by the courts.
23. See Campbell v. Bell, 12 La. Ann. 193 (1857).
24. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1991, 2433 (1870) ; Cosgrove v. His Creditors,
41 La. Ann. 274, 6 So. 585 (1889).
25. See note 16 supra.
* 26. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2425-2426 (1870).
27. It was not until Davock v. Darcy, 6 Rob. 342 (La. 1844) that a court
held the article now appearing as LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2425 (1870) was merely
illustrative.
28. See Jones v. Jones, 119 La. 677, 44 So. 429 (1907) ; Walmsley v. Theus,
107 La. 417, 31 So. 869 (1901) ; Succession of D~jan, 40 La. Ann. 437, 4 So. 89
(1888) ; Brown & Learned v. Smyth, 40 La. Ann. 325, 4 So. 300 (1888) ; Kirk-
patrick v. Finney & Byrnes, 30 La. Ann. 223 (1878) ; Webb v. Bell, 24 La.
Ann. 75 (1872) ; Spencer v. Rist, 16 La. Ann. 318 (1861) ; Holmes v. Barbin,
15 La. Ann. 553 (1860) ; Mock v. Kennedy, 11 La. Ann. 525, 66 Am. Dec. 203
(1856) ; Wolfe & Clark v. Lowry, 10 La. Ann. 272 (1855) ; Penn v. Crockett,
7 La. Ann. 343 (1852) ; Jones v. Widow & Heirs of Morgan, 6 La. Ann. 630
(1851) ; Davock v. Darcy, 6 Rob. 342 (La. 1844).
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The existence of the action for separation of property is a
potential threat to the creditors of the husband and of the com-
munity, since a successful action brings the wife, as another
secured creditor, into competition with existing creditors. 29 For
this reason the action can be used to defraud creditors and
others with an interest in the property under the husband's
control by manufacturing false claims to reduce the assets avail-
able to these other creditors. Therefore, the law allows credit-
ors to attack the action both before and after the judgment is
rendered.30 The judgment may be attacked on the following
grounds: (1) that the requirements for publication, designed
to put the creditors on notice, have not been followed ;31 (2) that
the judgment is the result of a consent decree;32 (3) that the
judgment has not been executed by either a dation en paiement
to the wife33 or a bona fide uninterrupted suit to obtain pay-
29. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2376 (1870).
30. Id. art. 2434: "The creditors of the husband may object to the separation
of property decreed and even executed with a view to defraud them. They may
even become parties to the suit for a separation of property, and be heard
against it."
31. Id. art. 2429: "The separation of property, obtained by the wife, must be
published three times in the public newspapers, at farthest within three months
after the judgment which ordered the same.
"If there be no paper published in the place where the judgment is rendered,
the publication must be made in that which is published in the place nearest
to it."
But courts have held that failure to publish, of itself, is not a ground for
absolute nullity. See Jones v. Jones, 119 La. 687, 44 So. 432 (1907) ; Brown &
Learned v. Smyth, 40 La. Ann. 325, 4 So. 300 (1888); Raiford v. Thorn, 15
La. Ann. 81 (1860) ; DeBlanc v. DeBlanc, 4 La. 419 (1832) ; Turnbull v. Cebra,
1 Mart.(N.S.) 611 (La. 1823).
32. Although the wife may have acquired a judgment declaring separation
of property, if the judgment resulted from a non-contested suit, the creditors of
the husband and community may attack the validity of the judgment on this
ground. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2427 (1870) : "[S]eparation of property . . . can
only be ordered by a court of justice, after hearing all parties. It can in no
case, be referred to arbitration." See Driscoll v. Pierce, 115 La. 156, 38 So.
949 (1905). But voluntary acquiescence by a party to a judgment of separation
of property precludes his right to assert its nullity. See King v. King, 155 La.
19, 98 So. 742 (1923) ; Andrews v. Sheehy, 125 La. 217, 51 So. 122 (1909);
Succession of Corrigan, 42 La. Ann. 65, 7 So. 74 (1890) ; Dipuma v. Anselmo,
137 So. 2d 76 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
33. To obtain a separation of property the wife's interest must be in im-
mediate danger, thus if the wife's claim is not satisfied once she has the judg-
ment, the presumption is that she had no need for the judgment. LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 2428 (1870) : "The separation of property, although decreed by a court of
justice, is null, if it has not been executed by the payment of the rights and
claims of the wife, made to appear by an authentic act as far as the estate of
the husband can meet them. ... See LaRose v. Naquin, 150 La. 353, 90 So.
676 (1922) ; Morrison v. Citizens' Bank, 27 La. Ann. 401 (1875) ; Bertie v.
Walker, 1 Rob. 431 (La. 1842).
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ment,84 though there are two exceptions to this rule;35 and (4)
that the action and judgment is a fraud on the rights of the
creditors.8 6 The availability of such collateral attacks has the
important effect of making termination of the community by
separation of property tentative and uncertain. The community
is deemed never to have terminated if the judgment of separa-
tion of property is successfully attacked; but until such time
the termination stands as valid. If creditors succeed in nullify-
ing the judgment, interim acts involving the spouses and their
property are subject to the rules usually applicable to the com-
34. The requirement that there must be a bona fide uninterrupted suit has
the same rationale as the requirement for a dation en paiement, being alternative
methods of enforcing the claim that the wife has received by her judgment for
separation of property. See note 33 supra. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2428 (1870) :
"The separation of property . . . is null, if it has not been executed . . . or at
least [attempted] by a bona fide non-interrupted suit to obtain payment." See
LaRose v. Naquin, 150 La. 353, 90 So. 676 (1922).
The court has set no certain time for bringing the suit to execute the judg-
ment of separation of property, other than it must be a reasonable time. A delay
from July to October was held not such an unusual delay as to cause nullity in
Bertie v. Walker, 1 Rob. 431 (La. 1842). From the first part of November to
the end of March in the following year it was also held not to be an unreasonable
delay in Cornier v. Ryan, 10 La. Ann. 688 (1855). On the other hand, eleven
months' delay was held unreasonable and entailed nullity in Nachman v. LeBlanc,
28 La. Ann. 345 (1876).
The French allow a definite time, 15 days, in which the suit must be brought.
FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1444.
However, there is a line of cases containing dictum that a judgment for
separation of property based upon sufficient proof, and accompanied by a
money judgment against the husband which has not been promptly executed,
will be good as far as the termination of the community is concerned, although
void with respect to the money judgment. See Walmsley v. Theus, 107 La. 417,
31 So. 869 (1901) ; Vickers v. Block, 31 La. Ann. 672 (1879) ; Jones v. Morgan,
6 La. Ann. 630 (1851) ; Henderson v. Trousdale, 10 La. Ann. 548 (1855).
For a discussion and analysis of these cases, see Jones v. Jones, 119 La. 677,
44 So. 432 (1907), indicating it is noteworthy that the language of LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 2428 (1870), provides the separation of property is null, not that the
money judgment is null.
35. The exceptions are: (1) where the wife has reduced her claim to a
money judgment, but the husband's financial condition is in such a state that
the execution of the judgment would be in vain, Holmes v. Barbin, 13 La. Ann.
474 (1858) ; and (2) where the wife is already in possession of her paraphernal
property and her claim is thus satisfied without the execution of the judgment,
Chafe v. Frocheimer, 35 La. Ann. 205 (1883).
36. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2434 (1870), quoted in note 30 8upra. See Pelletier
v. State Nat'l Bank, 117 La. 335, 41 So. 640 (1906). The creditors have a right
to demand production of the evidence upon which the judgment for separation of
property was based. See Campbell v. Bell, 12 La. Ann. 193 (1857). But if the
creditors suspect fraud, they must allege it. See Brown & Learned v. Smyth,
40 La. Ann. 325, 4 So. 300 (1888); Levistones v. Brady, 11 La. Ann. 696
(1856) ; Turner v. Luckett, 2 La. Ann. 885 (1847). The creditors may attack
the validity of the separation of property if the wife has not proved that the
disorder of the husband's affairs endanger her present separate property, or her
future acquisitions. See Bransford v. Bransford, 46 La. Ann. 1214, 15 So. 678
(1894). If the wife can meet all these attacks, her judgment is sustained. See
Bird v. Duralde, 23 La. Ann. 319 (1871).
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munity property system.3 7
Article 243238 provides that the judgment of separation of
property is retroactive to the time of filing the suit. Such retro-
activity is necessary to achieve the purpose of the action for
separation of property -protection of the wife's interest. As
the right of action comes into existence only after the danger
to the wife's interest has materialized, it is only reasonable that
the remedial effects should be retroactive. Of course, when
there is neither dowry nor paraphernal property to be returned,
the need for retroactivity is less urgent. The limitations placed
on the action, nonetheless, justify retroactivity even in the case
where the wife's future earnings are the only asset at stake. As
a general rule, the wife's earnings fall into the community until
it is terminated ;39 thus the sooner the termination is deemed
effective by using the retroactive rule, the sooner the wife's
earnings are classified as the wife's separate property.
40
The separation of property is necessarily judicial.41 Though
voluntary separations have been attempted in some cases, 42 the
courts have struck down the separation, on the authority of the
code article which explicitly states that a voluntary separation
is null and has no effect.43
The action for separation of property must be distinguished
from the action of the wife to recover her paraphernal funds
provided in articles 2387 and 2391. The action for separation
of property comes from Roman law, independent of a commu-
nity property system.44 The action of the wife for return of
paraphernal funds neither recovers the dowry nor terminates
an existing community, 45 the function of separation of property.
37. See Campbell v. Bell, 12 La. Ann. 193 (1857); Hanna v. Pritchard, 6
La. Ann. 730 (1851).
38. LA CIVIL CODE art. 2432 (1870) : "The judgment which pronounces the
separation of property, is retroactive as far back as the day on which the peti-
tion for the same was filed."
39. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2334, 2386, 2402 (1870).
40. Id. art. 2393.
41. .Id. art. 2427: "The wife must petition for the separation of property
and it can only be ordered by a court of justice, after hearing all parties. It can,
in no case, be referred to arbitration.
"Every voluntary separation of property is null, both as respects third per-
sons and the husband and wife between themselves."
42. See Sonnier v. Fris, 220 La. 1085, 58 So. 2d 393 (1952) ; Humphreys v.
Royal, 215 La. 567, 41 So. 2d 220 (1949); Brown v. Tauzin, 185 La. 86, 168
So. 502 (1936) ; Driscoll v. Pierce, 115 La. 156, 38 So. 949 (1905) ; Joffrion v.
Bordelon, 14 La. Ann. 618 (1859) ; Hotard v. Hotard, 12 La. Ann. 145 (1857).
43. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2427 (1870).
44. See notes 14 and 15 supra.
45. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2387 (1870) : "The wife who has left to her husband
1964] 247
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Therefore, the limitations of the action for separation of prop-
erty are not applicable; thus, the wife may sue for restitution
at any time during the marriage.
46
DEATH
Death of one of the spouses is a natural event which termi-
nates the community. 47 Though this seems a logical, as well as
desirable, effect of death, it has not always been so in the French
community system.48 In France prior to the fourteenth century,
death did not terminate the community if there were either
major or minor children of the marriage. 49 The acquisitions of
the surviving spouse continued to fall into the community, al-
though the acquisitions of the children did not.50 Nor did the
remarriage of the survivor terminate the community, which be-
came instead a three-sided relationship (tripartU).51 Obviously,
this system of the continued community led to much confusion,
especially on the remarriage of the surviving spouse.5 2 Conse-
quently, near the beginning of the fourteenth century the law
was changed, the community continuing only during the minor-
ity of children. 53 Though this law remained in effect in parts
of France even into this century, it was not included in the
French Code, 54 perhaps not because of the confusion arising
the administration of her paraphernal property, may afterwards withdraw it
from him."
Id. art. 2391: "The wife has, even during marriage, a right of action against
her husband for the restitution of her paraphernal effects and their fruits, as
above expressed."
See Falconer v. Falconer, 167 La. 595, 120 So. 19 (1929) ; Wilkinson v.
Wilkinson, 147 La. 315, 84 So. 794 (1920) ; Jenkins v. Maier, 118 La. 130, 42
So. 722 (1907) ; Bordes v. Duprat, 52 La. Ann. 306, 26 So. 821 (1899) ; Smith
v. Reddick, 42 La. Ann. 1055 (1890) ; Joly v. Weber, 35 La. Ann. 806 (1883) ;
Hawes v. Bryan, 10 La. 136 (1836) ; Gilbeaux's Heirs v. Cormier, 8 Mart.(N.S.)
228 (La. 1829). But see Viguerie v. Viguerie, 133 Ia. 406, 63 So. 89 (1913),
overruled by Carter v. Third District Homestead, 195 La. 555, 197 So. 230
(1940). Moreover, granting a mortgage does not defeat the wife's right to sue
for and recover her paraphernal funds. See Burns v. Thompson, 39 La. Ann.
377, 1 So. 913 (1887) ; Pascal v. Folse, 48 La. Ann. 1227, 20 So. 750 (1896)
DeLesdernier v. DeLesdernier, 45 La. Ann. 1364, 14 So. 191 (1893).
46. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2387, 2391 (1870); Burns v. Thompson, 39
La. Ann. 377, 1 So. 913 (1887) ; Joly v. Weber, 35 La. Ann. 806 (1883).
47. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 136, 2406 (1870); Culpepper v. Slater, 131
So. 2d 76 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).




51. Ibid. "Tripartg" was used because there were three groups participating
- the children of the first marriage, the surviving spouse, and the new spouse.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. See 1 DALLoz, ENCYCLOPEDIA, Communautd no 1653 (1951).
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from the accounting for the assets, but because of the lack of:
social justification for continuing the community when the,
marital relationship had ceased. 55 The Louisiana Codes, unlike
the French tradition, have always provided for termination of
the community upon the death of either spouse. 56 There were,
however, some early cases in which the underlying theory of
the continued community was mooted, but early in the nine-
teenth century the continuation of the community after death
was ruled impossible in our law.5
7
The rule that the community is absolutely terminated is not:
changed by the concept that the community has a fictitious ex-
istence after its termination for the payment of debts,58 though
at times the courts have had difficulty in reaching this conclu-,
sion. Although there is support for the concept inasmuch as:
the community creditors have a priority on the community
assets over the separate creditors of the spouses, the court's
difficulty results from a misunderstanding of the implications
of the term "fictitious community" which is used to describe
the concept. The estate tax cases5 9 present the most obvious
examples of the court's difficulty, the problem in these cases
being one of deciding whether assets of the estate or the com-
munity are to be reduced by the cost of administering the "fic-
titious community. ' 60 The nature of the administration is that
55. See 2 TROPLONG, DROIT CIVIL EXPLIQUt, Du contrat de mariage no 531(1850).
56. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 136, 2406 (1870).
57. The difficulty arose from the custom of continuing the community after
the death of one of the spouses until an inventory was made, based upon the
authority of practice and the FuERo REAL (1255). This custom was rejected
as repugnant to the Louisiana community system by Broussard v. Bernard, 7
La. 216 (1834) and Pizerot v. Meuillon's Heirs, 3 Mart.(O.S.) 97 (La. 1813).
58. See Demoruelle v. Allen, 218 La. 603, 50 So. 2d 208 (1950) ; Tomme v.
Tomme, 174 La. 123, 139 So. 901 (1932); Guillory v. Latour, 138 La. 142,
70 So. 66 (1915); Newman v. Cooper, 46 La. Ann. 1485, 16 So. 481 (1894);
Succession of Hooke, 46 La. Ann. 353, 15 So. 150 (1894) ; Landreaux v. Louque,
43 La. Ann. 234, 9 So. 32 (1891) ; Insurance Co. v. Levi, 42 La. Ann. 432, 7
So. 625 (1890) ; Succession of Dumestre, 42 La. Ann. 411, 7 So. 624 (1890)
Union Homestead Ass'n v. Cooil, 4 Orl. App. 179 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1907).
59. See McCullough v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. La. 1955)
Vaccaro v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 932 (E.D. La. 1944), aff d, 149 F.2d
1014 (5th Cir. 1945).
60. The tax in these cases is calculated as a percentage of the decedent's
estate. Thus the amount of the tax is decreased when the estate is reduced by the
cost of administering the "fictitious community." Cases have held over govern-
mental opposition that, the community being terminated, the whole cost of
administration is chargeable to the decedent's estate, regardless of benefit to the
surviving spouse. See McCullough v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 673 (W.D. La.
1955) ; Vaccaro v. United States, 55 F. Supp. 932 (E.D. La. 1944), affd, 149
F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1945) ; accord, Succession of Helis, 226 La. 133, 75 So. 2d
221 (1954).
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after the death of his wife the husband controls the community
until it is settled; or if the husband predeceases his wife, his
succession usually handles these duties of the "fictitious com-
munity."'61 The reason the administration is given to the hus-
band or his estate can be supported by two interrelated theories:
(1) The husband or his estate is always liable for the debts
of the community, whereas the wife or her heirs may accept the
community with benefit of inventory or renounce it, thus pos-
sibly being relieved of their interest in the community and its
debts ;62 and (2) the courts have settled on this procedure since
no procedure is prescribed by the Code. 8
The term "fictitious community" should not imply that the
original community has continued, but should only describe a
state of settlement- the community assets while in liquida-
tion. This is evidenced by numerous cases which, referring to
the fictitious existence of the community after dissolution, hold
that the spouses' interest in the community attaches immediate-
ly on the death of either spouse . 4 The interest of the spouses
in the community is restricted to the residuum of the commu-
nity property after all the debts have been paid ;65 to determine
this residuum the property must be inventoried and the debts
paid. The term "fictitious community" is merely a convenient
phrase to describe the state of the property while this residuum
is being determined. Unless there are debts, there is no need
for the "fictitious community."66
ABSENCE
The Code provides that if a person has been absent for a
61. Guillory v. Latour, 138 La. 142, 150, 70 So. 66, 68 (1915): "[S]uch
liquidation and payment cannot be effected in the succession of the wife; and
... the administration of the wife's succession has no power to provoke the sale
of community property for the payment of community debts." See Succession
of Helis, 226 La. 133, 75 So. 2d 221 (1954) (McCaleb, .1., dissenting); Succes-
slon of McLean, 12 La. Ann. 222 (1857).
62. See LA. R.S. 9:2821 (1950). See also Balis v. Mitchell, 48 So. 2d 691
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1950), where this law was given as a justification for the
"fictitious community."
63. Though the Louisiana Civil Code provides many rules and presumptions
to be made during the liquidation of the community's assets, there is no pro-
cedural framework set up for their accomplishment. For a favorable discussion
for the administration being given the husband or his succession, see Comment,
22 TUL. L. REv. 486 (1948).
64. See, e.g., Succession of Hooke, 46 La. Ann. 353, 15 So. 150 (1894)
Landreaux v. Louque, 43 La. Ann. 234, 9 So. 32 (1891) ; Succession of Dumestre,
42 La. Ann. 411, 7 So. 624 (1890); Insurance Co. v. Levi, 42 La. Ann.'432,
7 So.'625 (1890).
65. See Tomme v. Tomme, 174 La. 123, 139 So. 901 (1932).
66. See Succession of Dumestre, 42 La. Ann. 411, 7 So. (24 (1890).
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certain period, his presumptive heirs may petition to be sent
into provisional possession of his estate, as if it were known
that he was dead. 67 Provision is made, however, for the spouse
of the absentee to prevent this provisional possession by elect-
ing to continue the community."" This right of election is not
dependent on the demand of the presumptive heirs for provi-
sional possession. If the absentee is the wife, the husband con-
tinues the administration of the community as if she were pres-
ent;69 if the husband is the absentee, the wife manages the com-
munity, though it has not been clarified by the courts whether
the wife has the powers of the head and master. 70
The French Code provides that the "provisional community"
terminates thirty years after the spouse of the absentee elected
to continue the community.7' The Louisiana Code contains no
such rule, but it does allow known heirs to have absolute posses-
sion if the absence lasts thirty years. 72 It is assumed that 'if
they have this power, they may have the "provisional commu-
67. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 57 (1870) : "When a person shall not have appeared
at the place of his domicile or habitual residence, and when such person shall
not have been heard of, for five years, his presumptive heirs may, by producing
proof of the fact, cause themselves to be put by the competent judge into pro-
visional possession of the estate which belonged to the absentee at the time of
his departure, or at the time he was heard of last, on condition of their giving
security for their administration."
Id. art. 58: "If the absentee has left a power of attorney, his presumptive
heirs cannot cause themselves to be put into provisional possession, until seven
years shall have elapsed since the last intelligence of him has been received."
68. Id. art. 64: "The husband or wife of the absentee, who is not separated
in estate from him or her, and who wishes to continue to enjoy the benefit of
the community or partnership of matrimonial gains, which existed between them,
may prevent the provisional possession or exercise of all the rights which may
depend upon the death of the absentee, and claim and preserve for himself or
herself in preference to any other person, the administration of the estate of his
or her absent husband or wife.
"If on the contrary the husband or wife of the absentee chooses rather to
have the community dissolved, he or she may exercise and claim all his or her
rights, both legal and conventional, on his or her giving security for such things
as may be liable to be restored.
"The wife who elects to have the community continued, has, notwithstanding,
the right of renouncing it afterwards."
69. See Pedlahore v. Pedlahore, 151 La. 288, 91 So. 738 (1922) ; 2 TROPLONG,
DROIT CIVIL EXPLIQUit, Du contrat de mariage nos 540-541 (1850).
70. In French law it seems as though the wife's powers of administration
are limited to ordinary administration and not the administration that the hus-
band enjoys as head and master of the community. See 2 TROPLONG, DROIT
CIVIL ExPLIQU, Du contrat de mariage nos 540-541 (1850) ; cf. LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 50 (1870).
71. FRENCIH CIVIL CODE art. 124.
72. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 70 (1870), as amended: "If the absence has lasted
thirty years a presumption of death shall follow and the known heirs of the
absentee may petition the court and cause themselves to be put in absolute pos-
session of the property and estate of the absentee by the judge, and thereafter
deal with such property as the absolute and unconditional owners."
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nity" declared dissolved by the legal presumption of death. 7
Instead of electing to continue the community, the spouse
of the absentee may elect to dissolve the community at any time
and exercise all legal and conventional rights which ordinarily
mature on termination of the community.7 4 The absentee's share
of the community would then become subject to the code pro-
visions for provisional possession by the presumptive heirs.7 5
DIVORCE AND SEPARATION FROM BED AND BOARD
As the Louisiana Code states that the effects of divorce are
the same as separation from bed and board with respect to the
community, the two procedures of automatic76 termination may
be treated together.7 7 One of the major problems of termination
73. Ibid. But cf. LA. R.S. 9:1441 (Supp. 1963) : "A person on active duty
in one of the armed services of the United States, who has been reported missing
under circumstances which have induced the armed service to which he was
attached to accept the presumption of his death, shall likewise be presumed dead
under the law of this state."
Id. 9:1442: "A. The succession of a person presumed dead, as provided in
R.S. 9:1441, may be opened, administered, and his heirs or legatees sent into
absolute possession of his estate, by the district court of the parish where he was
domiciled at the time of entering the armed service, and in the same manner as
the succession of a deceased person, except as otherwise provided in R.S. 9:1443.
His heirs and legatees sent into possession of his property judicially may there-
after deal with such property as the absolute and unconditional owners, and
third persons may deal with them as such.
"B. If it is subsequently discovered that the person presumed dead is alive,
and within thirty years of the date of the judgment of possession he demands
the return of his property, the persons sent into possession thereof as his heirs
or legatees shall return to him all such property which they still own, subject
to the mortgages and other encumbrances which they have placed thereon.
These persons shall also repay him the value of all property of which they were
sent into possession and which they have alienated, and the amount of the mort-
gages and other encumbrances which they placed on property returned to him.
The persons sent into possession as his heirs or legatees shall return to him the
annual revenues of his property as provided in Article 68 of the Civil Code."
Id. 9:1443: "In a proceeding to open the succession of a person presumed
dead, as provided in R.S. 9:1441, or in any other action or proceeding whatever
in which the presumption of death is an issue, this presumption may be proved
by a certified copy of an official certificate of the armed service to which he
was attached, or of pertinent excerpts from his service record, indicating that
the armed service has accepted the presumption of his death."
74. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 64 (1870).
75. See Pedlahore v. 1'edlahore, 151 La. 288, 91 So. 738 (1922).
76. Neither party is required to ask for a termination of the community in
a suit for separation from bed and board or divorce. Courts have held that it is
an automatic and necessary consequence of LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 123, 136, 155
(1870). See McNeal v. McNeal, 233 La. 269, 96 So. 2d 563 (1957) ; Conrad v.
Conrad, 170 La. 312, 127 So. 735 (1930), overruling White v. White, 153 La.
313, 95 So. 791 (1923) ; Davis v. Davis, 23 So. 2d 651 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1945).
77. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 159 (1870) : "The effects of a divorce shall not only
be the same as are determined in the case of a separation from bed and board,
but it shall also dissolve forever the bonds of matrimony, between the parties,
-and place them in the same situation with respect to each other as if no mar-
riage had ever been contracted between them."
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by separation from bed and board or divorce was whether the
termination was retroactive to date of filing suit. The problem
arose as a result of confusing the separation from bed and board
with the action for separation of property. Some decisions have
implied that since the phrase separation from bed and board
"carries with it separation of goods and effects," so that " a de-
cree of divorce or separation from bed and board is necessarily
a decree of dissolution of community," then an action for either
divorce or separation from bed and board is equivalent to an
action for separation of property. 8 It is submitted, however,
that termination of the community by the action for separation
of property is distinct from termination of the community as a
consequence of separation from bed and board or divorce.79 The
action for separation of property has the purpose of protecting
the wife's property interest, while the termination which results
from separation from bed and board or divorce is more akin to
that which results from the death of one of the spouses: both
result from the dissolution of the matrimonial relationship.80
In light of this distinction between the action for separation
of property and that for divorce or separation from bed and
when all other effects of the judgment of divorce or separation
board, it seems that the community must terminate at the time
from bed and board become operative - when the judgment be-
comes final.81 However, the Louisiana jurisprudence in this
area has a checkered history, confusing the retroactive date for
termination, appropriate in an action for separation of prop-
erty,82 with the effective date for termination in an action for
divorce or separation from bed and board.88 In the latter case
78. See Conrad v. Conrad, 170 La. 312, 127 So. 735 (1930); Williams v.
Goss, 43 La. Ann. 868, 9 So. 750 (1891).
79. See Hill v. Caze, 136 La. 625, 67 So. 520 (1915). It is admitted that
a judgment of separation from bed and board creates a state of separation of
property, but this does not mean that it is related to an action for separation
of property merely because the latter, for unrelated reasons, also creates a state
of separation of property. See also note 12 supra.
80. See Demoruelle v. Allen, 218 L a. 603, 50 So. 2d 208 (1950) ; Crochet v.
Dugas, 126 La. 285, 52 So. 495 (1910) ; McCaffrey v. Benson, 40 La. Ann. 10,
3 So. 393 (1888).
81. See Cassagne v. Cassagne, 207 La. 1033, 22 So. 2d 559 (1945).
82. See LA. CIVIL CODF art. 2432 (1870).
83. The first case to use the retroactive rule for a judgment of separation
from bed and board was Gastauer v. Gastauer, 131 La. 1, 58 So. 1012 (1912).
This case was relied on by Talbert v. Talbert, 199 La. 882, 7 So. 2d 173 (1942) ;
Dewenter v. Mott, 27 So. 2d 444 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1946); Alpha v. Aucoin,
167 So. 835 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1936). The cases refusing to apply the retro-
active rule are Ruff ino v. Hunt, 234 La. 91, 99 So. 2d 34 (1958) ; Abraham v.
Abraham, 233 La. 808, 98 So. 2d 197 (1957); Coney v. Coney, 230 La. 821,
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the need for retroactivity does not exist. The error of deci-
sions holding to the retroactive view seems to lie in a misinter-
pretation of an earlier case, in which a suit for separation from
bed and board coincided with a suit for separation of property.8
Undoubtedly, both the rationale and the need for the community
dies with dissolution of the marriage; but if the marriage, or
the obligation to live as man and wife, lasts until the judgment
is final, why should the community not have the same life?
It has been suggested that a retroactive judgment of separa-
tion from bed and board is needed to protect the wife's interest,
since the community is managed by the husband while suit is
pending.8 5 The relationship of the spouses during a suit for
separation from bed and board or divorce could cause the hus-
band to engage in drastic transactions involving the community
with the intent of injuring the wife's financial interest. But
injunction and other forms of relief specifically provided the
wife' 6 seem to be much better than a retroactive judgment. The
retroactive judgment is not a preventive, but a corrective,
measure, giving rise to a right of action against the husband
89 So. 2d 326 (1956); Abunza v. Olivier, 230 La. 445, 88 So. 2d 815 (1956);
Eiermann v. Modenbach, 198 La. 1062, 5 So. 2d 335 (1941); In re Koretke
Brass Co., 195 La. 415, 196 So. 917 (1940); Romero v. Leger, 133 So. 2d 897
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1961).
84. See Gustauer v. Gastauer, 131 La. 1, 58 So. 1012 (1912).
85. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1955-1956 Term -
Persons, 17 LA. L. REV. 303, 306 (1957). The best argument that can be made
for applying the retroactive rule to judgments of separation from bed and board
or divorce is that the legislature gave implied consent to this application when
amending article 155 of the Louisiana Civil Code, in 1944. La. Acts 1944,
No. 200, provided that when the community was re-established upon reconciliation
of the parties, the re-establishment was effective as of the date the suit for
separation from bed and board was filed.
86. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 149 (1870) : "During the suit for separation, the
wife may, for the preservation of her rights, require an inventory and appraise-
ment to be made for the movables and immovables which are in possession of her
husband, and an injunction restraining him from disposing of any part thereof
in any manner."
Id. art. 150: "From the day on which the action of separation shall be
brought, it shall not be lawful for the husband to contract any debt on account
of the community, nor to dispose of the immovables belonging to the same, and
any alienation by him after that time, shall be null, if it be proved that such
alienation was made with the fraudulent view of injuring the rights of the
wife."
LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 3751 (1960) : "The pendency of an action
or proceeding in any court, state or federal, in this state affecting the title to, or
asserting a mortgage or privilege on, immovable property does not constitute
notice to a third person not a party thereto unless a notice of the pendency of
the action or proceeding is made, and filed or recorded, as required by article
3752."
Id. art. 3944: "Either party to an action for separation from bed and board
or divorce may obtain injunctive relief without bond prohibiting the other party
from disposing of or encumbering community property."
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for the value of assets improperly alienated during the suit.
This correction could be valueless if the husband had complete-
ly dissipated his own and the community's assets in agreements
with good faith third parties. However, if the husband's im-
providence threatens the wife's income, she may sue for separa-
tion of property; the retroactive judgment would afford im-
mediate protection.8 7 There is no reason to prevent the wife
from bringing this action, whether she is plaintiff or defendant
in the separation or divorce suit.8  Moreover, since the wife's
earnings while living separate and apart from her husband do
not fall into the community, " a retroactive judgment is not
needed to protect them.
Prior to 1962, retroactive judgment for separation from bed
and board was without statutory mandate. In that year the
Code was amended to include the retroactivity rule90 after a
series of cases concluded that the retroactivity rule of separa-
tion of property was inappropriate for a judgment of separa-
tion from bed and board, and hence, that the community termi-
nated only when the judgment became final.91 The retroactive
judgment creates no serious problems as long as validly acquired
rights of third persons are protected. Nonetheless, the statutory
rule is inconsistent with the rationale of the marital commu-
nity. When the French courts had difficulty in determining
whether the judgment of separation from bed and board should
be retroactive, their Code was amended to allow retroactivity
without effect on third parties, 92 but the amendment has been
criticized by French writers.9 3 It is assumed that our article94
87. See Tanner v. Tanner, 229 La. 399, 86 So. 2d 80 (1956).
88. Ibid.
89. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2334 (1870), as amended.
90. Id. art. 155, as amended, La. Acts 1962, No. 178.
91. See note 83 supra.
92. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 252. This article was amended in 1886 to make
the judgment retroactive; it was again amended in 1919 to make clear that the
retroactive effect was only to apply to property.
93. See 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1156 (1959).
94. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 155 (1870), as amended: "The judgment of separa-
tion from bed and board carries with it the separation of goods and effects and
is retroactive to the date on which the petition for same was filed, but such
retroactivity shall be without prejudice (a) to the liability of the community-for
attorney's fees and cost incurred, or, (b) to rights validly acquired in the interim
between the commencement of the action and recordation of the judgment."
The specific protection given to attorney's fees results from a conflict in the
jurisprudence whether the wife's attorney's fees could be a debt of the com-
munity if the suit was not successful, turning on the issue of the wife's ability
to contract debts on behalf of the community, and if the community could be
liable for these attorney's fees should it be terminated retroactively to the date
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holding the community liable for rights validly acquired makes
the Louisiana rule the same as the French, though the language
of the Louisiana rule is not so clear.
As in the case of termination of the community by death,
there has been language concerning the community terminated
by separation or divorce which refers to its "fictitious exist-
ence" after termination.9 5 The spreading fiction seems to flow
from legislation9 6 which allows the wife judicially separated
or divorced, like the widow, to accept the community with bene-
fit of inventory.9 7 Thus, since both widows and wives, divorced
or separated, have the same opportunities to incur or avoid
the community debts, a similar use of the "fictitious com-
munity" is both logical and desirable.
TERMINATION OF THE PUTATIVE COMMUNITY
A marriage may be a nullity, but a community - a "putative
community" -may arise due to the good faith of one or both
spouses in contracting the marriage.9 8 Louisiana recognizes
that annulment of the marriage terminates the putative com-
munity" and produces essentially the same effects as divorce. 100
The good faith of either spouse is sufficient to establish the
putative community; it also allows the other spouse, regardless
of good faith, to share in the community. However, when only
one spouse enters a null marriage in good faith, his subsequent
bad faith should end the civil advantages of the marriage
of filing of the suit. For a holding that attorney's fees are not a debt of the
community, but a separate debt of the wife, see Alpha v. Aucoin, 167 So. 835
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1936) ; cf. Dauterive v. Sternfels, 164 So. 349 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1935) (medical expenses). For holdings that attorney's fees are a debt of
the community, see Tanner v. Tanner, 229 La. 399, 86 So. 2d 80 (1956) ; Talbert
v. Talbert, 199 La. 882, 7 So. 2d 173 (1942); Vicknair v. Terracina, 168 La.
417, 122 So. 276 (1929) ; Spiller v. Spiller, 170 La. 813, 129 So. 212 (1930) ;
Munchow v. Munchow, 136 La. 753, 67 So. 819 (1915) ; Benedict v. Holmes,
104 La. 528, 29 So. 256 (1900) ; Sciambra v. Sciambra, 153 So. 2d 441 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1963).
95. See Washington v. Palmer, 28 So. 2d 509 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947).
96. LA. R.S. 9:2821 (1950), originally enacted as La. Acts 1882, No. 4.
97. See Washington v. Palmer, 28 So. 2d 509 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1947).
98. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 117 (1870) : "The marriage, which has been declared
null, produces nonetheless, its civil effect as it relates to the parties and their
children, if it has been contracted in good faith."
Id. art. 118: "If only one of the parties acted in good faith, the marriage
produces its civil effects only in his or her favor, and in favor of the children
born of the marriage."
99. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 136 (1870).
100. Ibid.; cf. 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW 'TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION
BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 1150 (1959).
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for both spouses. 10 1 This termination of civil advantages of a
putative marriage would seem to terminate the community, but
it is possible that some time could elapse before annulment pro-
ceedings or settlement of an estate would reveal the termina-
tion. Due to the non-notoriety of the termination, the termina-
tion should be without prejudice to rights validly acquired by
third parties dealing with the putative community whose
termination had not been recognized.'
0 2
CIVIL DEATH AND GENERAL CONFISCATION
Formerly in the French community system and in the
Spanish community system, the punishments of civil death'03
and general confiscation' 0 4 respectively terminated the com-
munity.10 1 Civil death, imposed on convicted felons, was a de-
privation of all civil rights. It imitated the effects of natural
death.'06 General confiscation of all the property of one partner
in the community was imposed for high treason and was some-
what akin to civil death. Both methods of punishment were
intended to punish the guilty party only. °'0 Thus the innocent
spouse became a partner with the government until the former
community was liquidated. 0 8 The community was terminated,
not so much because both spouses could no longer contribute
to the community, but because the civilly dead could not own
property or perform any juridical act. 10 9 The main questions
that arose during the existence of civil death were what hap-
pened when the civilly dead were granted amnesty and whether
it was necessary to have an authentic act re-establish the com-
munity or whether it would be re-established automatically.'10
101. See Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. Fernandez, 159 So. 339 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1935) (dictum). An example would be a situation in which the putative
wife of a man with a previously undissolved marriage discovers the impediment
and does nothing.
102. The annulment could be retroactive without prejudice to rights validly
acquired in the interim. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 155 (1870).
103. Abolished in France by Law of May 31, 1854 (D.C. 54.4.91).
104. Spanish punishment for high treason was provided for in NOVISIMA
RECOPILACI6N bk. 10, tit. 4, L. 10-11 (1805). 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 188 (1943): "But such laws have been repealed by
Mexico and in Spain."
105. See ibid.; 2 TROPLONG, DROIT CIVIL EXPLIQUit, Du contrat de mariage
nos 539-540 (1850).








The question was never definitively answered before civil death
was abolished.
INSANITY
Though it has been advocated in several suits,"' insanity
on the part of one of the spouses cannot be grounds to terminate
the community. The community and the marital relationship
may be greatly affected by this event, but the proper remedy
is interdiction of the party.1" 2 When the husband is the inter-
dict, there should be no problem with respect to the community
as long as the wife is appointed curatrix; but if she were not
so appointed, and the curator's administration endangered her
interest, she might attempt an action for separation of prop-
erty, though there is no precedent for this action under these
circumstances.
RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMUNITY
French law has always allowed re-establishment of the com-
munity upon reconciliation of the parties separated from bed
and board, requiring only an authentic act duly recorded."8 The
Louisiana Civil Code did not initially provide for re-establish-
ment and the courts refused to adopt such a rule.1 4 In 1944,
however, the legislature provided for re-establishment com-
parable to the authentic act requirement of the French law. 15
The re-establishment of the community is effective retroactively
to the date of filing suit for judicial separation but without
prejudice to rights validly acquired in the interim.116
111. See Succession of Bothick, 52 La. Ann. 863, 28 So. 458 (1899) ; Hotard
v. Hotard, 12 La. Ann. 145 (1857); 22 LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL
FRANQAIS nos 230-232 (4th ed. 1887).
112. See note 111 supra.
113. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1451.
114. See Reichert v. Lloveras, 188 La. 447, 177 So. 569 (1937) ; Succession
of LeBesque, 137 La. 567, 68 So. 956 (1915); American Hoist & Derrick Co.
v. Frey, 127 La. 183, 53 So. 486 (1910) ; Crochet v. Dugas, 126 La. 285, 52
So. 495 (1910) ; Ford v. Kittredge, 26 La. Ann. 190 (1874) ; DeBlane v. DeBlanc,
18 So. 2d 619 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1944).
115. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 155, as amended, La. Acts 1944, No. 22: "Upon
reconciliation of the spouses, the community may be re-established by the husband
and the wife jointly, as of the date of the filing of the suit for separation from
bed and board, by an act before a notary and two witnesses, which act shall be





It seems that a community terminated by any mode other
than separation from bed and board cannot be re-established
by authentic act. The language of the re-establishment article,
"upon reconciliation of the parties,' 117 definitely applies to a
separation from bed and board, and it seems unlikely that this
language could be interpreted to mean that a couple who had
been-divorced and remarried could re-establish the community
from the date of the suit for divorce. It is remotely possible
that the language could be interpreted to allow re-establishment
by authentic act of a community terminated by absence. How-
ever, on return of the absentee spouse, the marital community
probably is re-established by operation of law, as the Code pro-
vides termination of provisional possession in such circum-
stances. Can a community terminated by the wife's successful
action for separation of property be re-established by authentic
act? It is certainly possible that the financial condition of the
husband which provoked the suit may be cured, but the "recon-
ciliation" language of the article seems to make it wholly in-
applicable. The action for separation of property is not
prompted by an estrangement of the spouses, but only by the
peril of the financial interest of the wife; thus a real "reconcilia-
tion" is impossible. If re-establishment is desirable in such
situation, further legislation seems necessary.
Charles A. Snyder
THE MARITAL FOURTH AND THE
WIDOW'S HOMESTEAD
The community property system provides a measure of fi-
nancial security to the surviving spouse on the death of the
other by dividing the community estate into equal shares for the
patrimony of each spouse. Such security is insufficient if the
community is small or insolvent; hence the lawmaker has pro-
vided additional benefits.' Two of these benefits are the widow's
117. Id. art. 155, as amended, La. Acts 1962, No. 178.
1. These benefits are: the inheritance of the surviving spouse, provided by
LA. CIVIL CODE art. 915 (1870) ; the usufruct of the surviving spouse, provided
by id. art. 916; the marital fourth, provided by id. art. 2382; the widow's home-
stead, provided by id. art. 3252.
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